31 HIDDEN TREASURE Again, the kingdom of heaven is like unto treasure hid in a field; the which when a man hath found, he hideth, and for joy thereof goeth and selleth all that he hath, and buyeth that field (Matt. 13:44).
The theocentric principle here is the high value of the kingdom of God. It is so high that a wise man will sell all that he has in order to buy it if it is available for purchase. The next parable in the passage reinforces this one: "Again, the kingdom of heaven is like unto a merchant man, seeking goodly pearls: Who, when he had found one pearl of great price, went and sold all that he had, and bought it" (Matt. 13:45-46).
Lost and Found(1) This parable seems to be contradictory to the Mosaic law of lost property: "Thou shalt not see thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, and hide thyself from them: thou shalt in any case bring them again unto thy brother. And if thy brother be not nigh unto thee, or if thou know him not, then thou shalt bring it unto thine own house, and it shall be with thee until thy brother seek after it, and thou shalt restore it to him again. In like manner shalt thou do with his ass; and so shalt thou do with his raiment; and with all lost things of thy brother's, which he hath lost, and thou hast found, shalt thou do likewise: thou mayest not hide thyself. Thou shalt not see thy brother's ass or his ox fall down by the way, and hide thyself from them: thou shalt surely help him to lift them up again" (Deut. 22:1-4). Why isn't Jesus' example a case of lost property? Why isn't the finder required to report it to the presumed owner, i.e., the owner of the field? Because the treasure had been deliberately hidden.
Jesus was challenging Old Covenant Israel to cease hiding the treasure of salvation in a morass of legalism. The kingdom of heaven is not supposed to be hidden; it is to be shared with all the world. But someone had taken the treasure and had hidden it, He said. This was similar to the action taken by the responsibility-aversive wicked servant who refused to multiply his master's goods as a faithful steward -- another kingdom parable.
Then he which had received the one talent came and said, Lord, I knew thee that thou art an hard man, reaping where thou hast not sown, and gathering where thou hast not strawed: And I was afraid, and went and hid thy talent in the earth: lo, there thou hast that is thine. His lord answered and said unto him, Thou wicked and slothful servant, thou knewest that I reap where I sowed not, and gather where I have not strawed: Thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to the exchangers, and then at my coming I should have received mine own with usury. Take therefore the talent from him, and give it unto him which hath ten talents. For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath. And cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth (Matt. 25:24-30).(2)
The person who discovers a hidden treasure is not under any obligation to inform the owner of the field of its existence. Someone had taken steps to hide the asset. The original owner had decided to invest the treasure merely by hiding it. This is not the best way to increase wealth except in times of warfare or widespread theft. It is better to put the asset to work. The hidden asset probably is not being used productively. The finder takes a great risk by selling everything he owns to make a bid on the field. The field's owner, if he knows about the treasure, may dig it up and then sell the field -- now far overpriced -- to the finder. But if the field's owner does not know about the hidden treasure, the buyer is not under any moral obligation to tell him about it. The field's buyer is reclaiming the asset from the heirs of the original treasure-hider, who know nothing about the whereabouts of the treasure and who did not hide it. They have no legal claims on this property. They are not like the owner of lost property, who does have a legal claim. The treasure in the field is not marked. It is not the responsibility of the discoverer to seek out the heirs, who may be scattered across the face of the earth, depending on how long the treasure has been hidden. The person most likely to put the hidden treasure to productive use is the treasure-finder who is willing to sell all that he has to buy the field.
The Jews had hidden God's kingdom in Jesus' era. They were hoarding it. They were not taking it in its pure form to the gentiles. They had encrusted it with layers of man-made law, thereby hiding it. This was hampering the growth of the kingdom. This is why Jesus also said: "Therefore say I unto you, The kingdom of God shall be taken from you, and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof" (Matt. 21:43). Jesus was telling His listeners that they had found the hidden treasure: the kingdom of heaven. It was time for them to commit everything they owned to the spread of the good news of redemption: to gentiles as well as to Jews. The Jews refused to admit that what they had done by way of legalism and nationalism had concealed the kingdom from gentiles. Thus, the kingdom would soon rightfully be the property of the church, which would strip the message of redemption from its legalism and share it with the world. It was not that the kingdom had been lost; it had been deliberately hidden and kept out of plain sight. Thus, the Mosaic law of lost property did not apply in this parable.
Idle Resources and Entrepreneurship The economic principle governing hidden treasure is what W. H. Hutt called the theory of idle resources. Hidden treasure is not idle if it is the object of human decision-making. It is invested in a particular way. When resources are deliberately not being used to produce goods and services, this may be because of the owners' lack of information about how to maximize the value of the unused asset, i.e., to make it worth more in production than it is sitting idle. Or it may be because the owner is highly risk-aversive. Hutt's economic analysis also identifies bottlenecks of information created by government policy, such as minimum wage laws or other forms of price control.(3)
When an idle resource is idle because no one recognizes it as valuable, or because the owner has forgotten where it is hidden, then the way to get it back into production is to allow a finder to buy it. This is an application of the Austrian school's theory of entrepreneurship: profit as the result of the decision of an entrepreneur who bears the economic uncertainty associated with production. He believes that he possesses better knowledge regarding future consumer demand than his competitors do. He buys a productive good at a price that is lower than it would be if all producers recognized its highest future use. If his forecast is correct, and if he puts the underpriced asset to cost-effective use, then he gains his reward: an above-average rate of return on his investment. If his forecast is incorrect, or if he misallocates the resource, then he reaps losses.
To maximize the spread of accurate information and any consumer benefits associated with this information, the free market social order allows entrepreneurs to buy fields containing "hidden treasure." These fields are in the form of scarce resources that are not priced as high as they would be if other entrepreneurs knew the truth: hidden treasures are buried in them, i.e., there are benefits that consumers will be willing to pay for. These treasures are analogous to forgotten or ignored resources that are not being put to their maximum consumer-satisfying uses. In short, accurate information regarding the future is not the equivalent of a lost sheep that has wandered off and will soon be missed by the owner. It is the equivalent of a treasure buried long ago: taken out of production by a previous owner, and then forgotten. There is no moral reason why someone who finds a way to serve the public better through putting that treasure back into production should be required to broadcast this information to anyone. But he must not steal it; he must buy the field in which it is hidden. He must bear the costs of gaining ownership.
Risk and Information(4) Consider what the man in the parable was doing. He stumbles across an important piece of information. There is a valuable treasure hidden in a field. He is not sure just who it was who hid it, but it is there. He presumes that the person who hid it is not the present owner of the field. He is not certain of this at first, but he is willing to take a major step. He hides the treasure again, and goes out and sells everything that he owns. I suppose he did some preliminary investigating, just to see if the present owner will sell the field. But the present owner may change his mind. Or he may have known about the treasure all the time, and he is luring the speculator into a disastrous decision. The treasure may not really be that valuable. The discoverer cannot be certain. But he takes a chance. He sells everything, and goes to the owner with his money. He buys the field. Now he owns the treasure. He took advantage of special information: his knowledge of the existence of a treasure in a particular field. He took a risk when he sold everything that he owned to come up with the purchase price. Then he went back to the owner, thereby alerting the owner to a possible opportunity -- the possibility that something valuable is connected to the field. Maybe it would be unwise to sell it after all. But finally he decides to sell. The entrepreneur -- the man with the information and some venture capital -- has closed the deal. He has attained his goal.
The Socialist View The modern socialist would be outraged at this parable. He says, "The entrepreneur, who was striving to better his position, was acting immorally. First, the land he was on should have been owned by the people, through the State. Second, he had no business being on the land, without proper papers having been filed with the State in advance. Third, he should never have hidden the treasure again. It was the State's. Fourth, if it was not the property of the State, then he should have notified the private owner of the property. Fifth, failing this, he was immoral to make the offer to buy the property. He as stealing from the poor man who owned the property. Sixth, should he attempt to sell the treasure, the State ought to tax him at a minimum rate of 80 per cent. Seventh, if he refuses to sell, the State should impose a property tax, or a direct capital tax, to force him to sell."
What the socialist-redistributionist really objects to is mankind's lack of omniscience. The economy should operate as smoothly, as efficiently, and as profit-free as an economy in which each participant has perfect knowledge. Knowledge, in a "decent" social order, is a universally available free good, equally available to all, and equally acted upon by all. It is only the existence of private property, personal greed, and a willingness to exploit the poor that has created our world of scarcity, profits, and losses. Knowledge about the future should be regarded as a free good. Profits are therefore evil, not to mention unnecessary, in a sound economy. This has been the argument -- the real, underlying, implicit argument -- of all those who equate profits and exploitation.
Men are not God; they are not omniscient. This angers the socialists, and they strike out in wrath against the market order which seeks to encourage men to search for better information so that they can profit from its application in economic affairs. The socialists prefer to stop the search for information concerning the uncertain future, rather than to allow private citizens to profit personally from the use of knowledge in society.
The Transfer of Knowledge Accurate knowledge of the future is a valuable asset. How can society profit from its discovery and application? Not everyone wants to take the time and trouble to search out the future. No one can take the time and trouble to search out all the possible bits of information concerning an uncertain future that might be useful to him or his family. So, we allow others to do the work bear the risk of action, and sell us the results at a price we are willing and able to pay. We consumers become the users, and therefore the beneficiaries, of the entrepreneur's willingness and ability to peer into the future, take steps to meet the demand of the uncertain future, and deliver the finished product -- consumer good, consumer service, or spiritual insight -- at a price we are willing to pay. Why should we care what price he paid or what risks he bore when we pay the price? Of course, if we knew what he paid, we might guess that he is willing to take less than what he is asking, but why should we care from a moral standpoint what he paid versus what he is asking us to pay?
Besides, the existence of a profit on a transaction, if recognized by others, encourages other entrepreneurs to search out similar opportunities to present to us in the future. Let us consider the entrepreneur-worker. He accepts the job with ABC Widgets. The workers throw a farewell party for him. The conversation inevitably gets around to the reason why he is leaving. "Hey, Charlie, why are you leaving XYZ Widgets? Haven't we had great times together? What are you trying to do, get on their bowling team or something?" And Charlie may be willing to say, now that he knows he has his new job. He can look like a smart operator in front of his friends. "I'm leaving because I'm going to make 25 per cent more pay, that's why. Why should I stay here at XYZ Widgets and work for less than I'm worth?" That bit of information will make itself felt in the labor market of XYZ Widgets very, very fast. The management of XYZ Widgets will have to do some explaining, and perhaps make some wage adjustments for the workers, as the effects of the new knowledge are felt. Workers leave for ABC Widgets. The spread of information is rapid because the pay-off for those who have it is immediate and personally beneficial for those who act in terms of it.
A Chance to Profit from the Use of Better Knowledge Knowledge is a scarce economic resource. It is a good thing for members of society to act in terms of accurate information. It is certainly a wise policy to allow citizens to profit from the use of better knowledge. That way, there is an economic incentive for others to enter the "knowledge market" and take advantage of whatever knowledge is available. The spread of accurate knowledge is increased because of the profit potential offered to acting individuals. If better knowledge is a valuable asset, then its sale in the market should be encouraged.
Inaccurate knowledge should be dropped rapidly. How do we best stop the transfer of inaccurate knowledge? Make it expensive to act in terms of inaccurate knowledge. This is why we need opportunities to make losses as well as profits. Make the use of inaccurate knowledge expensive to those who use it, and you will discourage its transfer through the whole society. This is perhaps more important than encouraging the production or discovery of new, accurate knowledge. There are always more good ideas available than capital to finance them. But the continued use of bad ideas -- loss-producing ideas -- inhibits the build-up of capital. It is always very risky to launch a new project, since there are so many variables. But dropping a bad idea is an immediate benefit to society, for it increases the capital base -- the information base -- by removing a major source of capital consumption. The existence of losses testifies to the existence of inappropriate plans in an economy. Without negative feedback -- the loss portion of the profit-and-loss sheet -- society has no effective way to eliminate bad ideas. If men see the danger of establishing censorship boards to reduce the spread of knowledge, they had better cling to the free market's mechanism of eliminating resource-absorbing, erroneous information.
Conclusion The ethics of the parable is based on the suggestion that a treasure in a field belongs to the owner of the field. The field in this case belonged to Old Covenant Israel. This would not be true for much longer (Matt. 21:43). Hidden in that field was a lost treasure: the kingdom of God. To obtain possession of this treasure, the discoverer was told to commit everything he owns.
The top priority here is extending the kingdom of God. The proper response to the news of the kingdom is for a person to commit everything he owns to its extension. It is more valuable than personal wealth. It is the ultimate form of wealth.
There is another implication: do not hide this treasure. Israel had hidden it and was therefore about to lose possession of it. To keep ownership of it, a person or a society must share it. Its value increases as it is shared with others. The kingdom's division of labor increases when more people come into it. Its productivity increases because every participant's wealth increases. As with the telephone or other communications technology, the more people who use phones, the greater the value of the system to everyone. One telephone is useless. Two are not worth much. A telephone system is very valuable. Each additional installed telephone increases the value of all of them, even though mass production decreases its price. So it is with the kingdom of God.
Footnotes:
1. This section and the one that follows is taken from Chapter 50 of Gary North, Inheritance and Dominion: An Economic Commentary on Deuteronomy (Tyler, Texas: Institute for Christian Economics, 1999).
2. Chapter 45, below.
3. W. H. Hutt, The Theory of Idle Resources: A Study in Definition (2nd ed.; Indianapolis: LibertyPress, 1977).
4. The remainder of the chapter, though not the Conclusion, is taken from an essay that appeared in The Freeman.
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